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Jaime Gomez, Raquel Orcos, Sergio PalomasThis paper explores intra-industry heterogeneity by proposing a new perspective. Whereas the strategic management literature tends to
conceptualize strategic heterogeneity as the divergence between a focal firm and its rivals, we offer a complementary view in which we
consider it to be the result of the differences among the strategic positions of the rivals of a firm. We argue that, when heterogeneity is
examined from this perspective, vicarious learning and competitive alignment (instead of competition, collusion or legitimation) are the
mechanisms that explain the impact of heterogeneity on performance. We also propose that the experience that firms accumulate by
competing with the same rivals moderates this relationship. We test our hypotheses on the Spanish banking sector over the period
1999e2009. The results are consistent with them.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The traditional concern of strategic management with the differences in performance among the firms that populate an
industry has led researchers to focus on firm heterogeneity as a cornerstone in the analysis of competitive advantage (Barney,
1991; Peteraf, 1993; Scherer and Ross, 1990). From a strategic management perspective, heterogeneity tends to be concep-
tualized as a characteristic of the firm in relation to its rivals (i.e., how different a firm is compared to its direct competitors). In
contrast, in this article we maintain that heterogeneity can be conceptualized in other ways. We propose that heterogeneity
can also be understood as a property of the set of direct competitors of a focal firm (i.e., how different the competitors of a
focal firm are from each other). Thus, while the traditional approach to heterogeneity conceives heterogeneity as the strategic
distance between the focal firm and its direct rivals (Caves and Porter, 1977; McGee and Thomas, 1992; Peteraf, 1993), our
conception focuses on the heterogeneity stemming from the strategic distances among the direct rivals of the focal firm.
Our contention is that the degree of strategic heterogeneity among rivals determines both the amount of information
available from the observation of the strategies of rivals and the difficulties in designing effective competitive strategies. As a
consequence, we propose vicarious learning and competitive alignment as the most appropriate mechanisms to clarify the
impact of heterogeneity in the set of competitors on firm performance. We argue that both learning through observation and
competitive alignment are conditioned by the plurality of strategies that the rivals adopt. On the one hand, the strategic
heterogeneity in the set of competitors determines the quality and quantity of knowledge that can be learnt from them
(Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Barnett, 2008). A high level of strategic heterogeneity in the group of rivals offers greater
opportunities for acquiring knowledge through observation. On the other hand, heterogeneity also makes it more difficult for
the firm to find a strategic configuration that aligns with the strategies of all its rivals (Ghemawat, 1991; Barnett and Hansen,
1996). The combination of these two effects results in an inverted U relationship between strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors and focal firm performance.
This paper also analyzes how the experience accumulated with rivals conditions the impact of strategic heterogeneity
among competitors on performance. Firms can gather information about the strategic options of their rivals by observing
them or by retrieving past observations from the organizational memory (Huber, 1991). As firms accumulate competitive
experience, they have greater knowledge about the strategic positions of the rivals and, as a result, the need to observe their
rivals to obtain information about different strategic options decreases. We argue that, in these cases, competitive experience
replaces strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals as a source of learning for reasons based on information preference, in-
formation redundancy and information costs (Schwab, 2007). Consequently, basing our arguments on a learning perspective,
we argue that competitive experience negatively moderates the link between the strategic heterogeneity of the set of rivals
and firm performance.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2014.09.006
0024-6301/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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traditional perspective. By focusing on the position of the firm in relation to its competitors, the traditional approach said
nothing about whether these rivals were a relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous group. This may be seen as a gap in the
theory because, irrespective of the strategic position of a firm, rivals can show disparate levels of strategic heterogeneity. As
we show in this article, this characteristic of rivals influences the results of the firm. Consequently, the proposed approach
complements the traditional one and analyzes the consequences of strategic heterogeneity within an industry more
comprehensively.
Second, the new approach incorporates theoretical mechanisms that help us to understand the effect of strategic diversity
on firm performance. The traditional view argues in terms of legitimation, collusion and competitive behaviour to explain the
consequences of the strategic distance between the firm and its rivals (Cool and Dierickx, 1993; Deephouse, 1999;
Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). However,
these arguments are not well suited to the analysis of the strategic heterogeneity among competitors, as they are based on the
focal firm and its location in the strategic space. As we argue in this article, the mechanisms that explain the role of strategic
heterogeneity as a characteristic of the set of rivals are vicarious learning and competitive alignment. Consequently, this new
perspective not only complements, but also expands the analysis of strategic heterogeneity and its implications on firm
performance.
We test our hypotheses in the Spanish retail banking sector between 1999 and 2009. Like many other banking sectors in
the world, it underwent a deregulation process in the '80s and '90s of the past century which reduced the restrictions on the
activities that each kind of bank (commercial banks, saving banks and credit unions) was allowed to perform. As a result,
many different strategic orientations developed and the competitive patterns changed greatly. In the period analyzed, the
Spanish banking sector is a context in which we can take advantage of varying levels of heterogeneity to test our model.
Our results confirm that strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals influences focal firm performance in the form of an
inverted U. This means that firms whose direct rivals show an intermediate level of strategic heterogeneity will perform
better than firms operating in contexts of high or low levels of strategic heterogeneity. Our arguments, based on vicarious
learning and competitive alignment, expand our knowledge about intra-industry heterogeneity. Our findings also suggest
that competitive experience with the same rivals reduces the impact of strategic heterogeneity on firm performance. This is
an important contribution to the organizational learning literature because it suggests that a firm's competitive experience
and the strategic heterogeneity in its set of rivals can be considered alternative sources of information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we offer a brief overview of the previous conceptualization of strategic
heterogeneity and the mechanisms through which it influences firm performance. In addition, we explain the suitability of
vicarious learning and competitive alignment to explore the impact of strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals on firm
performance. Then, we develop our hypotheses about heterogeneity in the set of rivals and competitive experience. The
fourth Section describes the context inwhich we test these hypotheses, a representative sample of the Spanish retail banking
sector, and the fifth Section presents the results. Finally, the last Section concludes and discusses the main implications.Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework briefly describes the traditional approximations to the study of strategic heterogeneity and the
new perspective that is proposed in this paper. First, we review the main mechanisms used in strategic management to
analyze the consequences of heterogeneity when it is conceptualized as the strategic distance between the focal firm and its
rivals. Second, we present vicarious learning and competitive alignment as the mechanisms explaining the effect of het-
erogeneity when it is analyzed from our perspective: strategic distance among rivals.The traditional approach: the analysis of similarity between a firm and its competitors
The strategic heterogeneity between a focal firm and its rivals has received a great deal of attention in strategic man-
agement (Deephouse, 1999; Porter, 1980). Many strategy scholars have tried to determine the value of being different and the
value of being the same, given that this is important for managers as they try to achieve the right market position for their
firms. In spite of the efforts of researchers, there is still no agreement on the balance between similarity and differentiation
that firms should choose. The literature is divided between those who recommend occupying close positions to competitors
and those who are in favor of occupying distant ones. This lack of agreement may be due to the plurality of arguments used to
explain the effect of the strategic heterogeneity between a firm and its competitors on performance. Among these arguments,
those based on competition, legitimation and collusion are themost popular in the strategic management field (Barney,1991;
Baum andMezias, 1992; Caves and Porter, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan,1977). These mechanisms use
different suppositions and provide different predictions about the role of heterogeneity in competitive dynamics and
performance.
According to the competition mechanism, the distance between market positions reduces competitive intensity and,
therefore, improves firm performance. This mechanism considers that markets have finite resources that are divided among
competing firms according to their positions. Firms occupying the same position in themarket depend on similar resources to
develop their activities and, as a consequence, compete more intensively among themselves (Audia and Kurkoski, 2012;Please cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
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by avoiding direct competition for resources (Baum and Mezías, 1992; Porter, 1980, 1991).
The legitimation mechanism presumes that the organizational field legitimates a limited number of strategies or orga-
nizational templates. Adopting one of these templates provides legitimacy and institutional support, which secures the flow
of certain resources, reduces uncertainty and enhances survival. As firms try to conform to these templates, they become
more similar (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In contrast, firms that select a
strategy which differs from these templates lose legitimacy and experience difficulties to acquire resources (Ashforth and
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Thus, the legitimation mechanism assumes that similarity among firms adopting these tem-
plates confers legitimacy and improves firm performance.
Finally, the collusion mechanism proposes that similar firms tend to compete less aggressively among themselves. This
reduction in rivalry is mainly explained by two processes. First, similarity leads firms to recognize competitive in-
terdependences and increases familiarity (Caves and Porter, 1977). Similar firms are more likely to correctly understand the
decisions taken by the others and anticipate their moves more accurately. This makes tacit collusion easier and generates
incentives to forbear (Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 1979). Second, similar firms are likely to use the same resources and capabilities,
which increases their capability of retaliation against each other (Chen, 1996; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006). When the
retaliatory capability of rivals is high, initiating any exchange of competitive moves makes less sense and collusionwith these
rivals becomes more attractive.
While the competition mechanism considers that similarity in market positions negatively influences firm performance,
the legitimation and collusion mechanisms sustain that the effect of similarity is positive (Caves and Porter, 1977; Chen and
Hambrick, 1995; Miller and Chen, 1995; Porter, 1980, 1991). These three mechanisms are valid to analyze heterogeneity when
it is conceived as the distance between the market positions of a focal firm and its rivals, given that all three base their ar-
guments on the similarity or divergence between the focal firms and its rivals. However, when heterogeneity is conceptu-
alized as the level of dispersion of competitors' strategies, these arguments are not valid. As we will explain in the next
section, vicarious learning and competitive alignment are the mechanisms that better explain the impact of our comple-
mentary conception of heterogeneity.Heterogeneity in the set of competitors: similarity or divergence among direct rivals of the focal firm
Figure 1 graphically depicts the traditional approach and our proposal to exploring the impact of strategic heterogeneity.
While strategy scholars examine heterogeneity by focusing on the similarity or divergence between a focal firm and its rivals,
this article considers the heterogeneity that comes from strategic diversity in the group of direct competitors. By strategic
heterogeneity in the set of rivals we refer to the extent of variation in the strategic positions of the direct rivals of the focal
firm. Although many attributes of the firm could be analyzed to explore this variation, we focus on firm strategy, which is
conceptualized as the position of the firm in the competitive market (Porter, 1980).
The mechanisms reviewed in the previous section cannot be applied to the analysis of the effects of the strategic diversity
of the set of rivals. The competitionmechanism is determined by the extent towhich the resource requirements of a focal firm
overlap with the resource needs of its rivals. The degree to which a focal firm competes with other firms for the same re-
sources can only be determined by examining a focal firm's market position with respect to the market positions of its rivals.
Similarly, the legitimacy mechanism requires an understanding of the position of a firm with respect to its rivals to analyze
the way in which the focal firm resembles other firms as it adopts the established institutional practice. Valuing the extent to
which firms obtain legitimacy by converging towards some institutional templates involves considering the market position
of the focal firmwith respect to that of its rivals. Given that we focus on similarity or divergence among rivals, the legitimation
mechanism is not appropriate either. Finally, the collusion mechanism also requires comparing the market position of the
focal firm and its rivals. Similarity or divergence between firms determines the incentives to collude and cooperate because it
conditions the recognition of the competitive interdependences and of the retaliation capability of firms. Therefore, we also
exclude the collusion mechanism as an argument that can explain the influence of heterogeneity among rivals on firm
performance.
We propose that the mechanisms that best explain the link between our conception of heterogeneity and firm perfor-
mance are vicarious learning and competitive alignment. Both these mechanisms are directly influenced by the degree of
heterogeneity in the set of competitors. The variation in the strategies of rivals determines the number of strategic options
from which the focal firm can learn through observation and to which it may need to adjust. High levels of strategic het-
erogeneity in the set of rivals mean a greater possibility of gathering information about different strategic positions but, also,
more complexity in the achievement of competitive alignment. Thus, the strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals simul-
taneously conditions the ability of the firm to learn vicariously and to adjust to its local competitive environment. Next, we
offer a brief conceptualization of our explanatory mechanisms: vicarious learning and competitive alignment.
Vicarious learning is a specific form of organizational learning (Argote andMiron-Spektor, 2011). In spite of the importance
of organizational learning, the literature lacks an unanimous definition of the concept. Our approximation is based on the
perspective described by Huber (1991). We consider that a firm learns if, after processing information, the range of its po-
tential behaviors or actions is modified. This perspective assumes that learning involves acquiring information and trans-




Figure 1. (a) The traditional approach to heterogeneity. Strategic distance between the focal firm and its rivals. (b) A complementary approach to heterogeneity.
Strategic distances among rivals of the focal firm
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it is necessary they modify their conduct according to what they have previously learnt.
The first step in organizational learning is to gather information. Firms can obtain information from different sources
including their own experience, direct communication with other organizations, and observation (Huber, 1991; Lieberman
and Asaba, 2006). As mentioned above, this paper focuses on vicarious learning, which is a process in which firms obtain
information from the behaviors observed in other firms. We focus our attention on vicarious learning because of the im-
plications that strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals has on the result of the observation process. If the diversity in the
market positions of direct competitors is high, the focal firm can observe different strategies that are suitable to this specific
context. Conversely, if rivals are homogenous in terms of their market positions, the possibility of learning alternative courses
of action through observation is lower.
We focus on vicarious learning from direct competitors because they are usually the primary reference points of obser-
vation. Direct rivals experience similar environments, opportunities and threats (Greve, 2000). As a result, their observation
offers accurate information on the outcome of different strategies, reducing search, experimentation or implementation costs
(Bikhchandani et al., 1998). This means that, through learning vicariously from competitors, the firm learns about alternative
courses of action that may be taken to seize opportunities and to respond to threats (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). In other
words, observation helps the firm to take advantage of opportunities and reduces the risk of committing strategic mistakes
(Kim and Miner, 2007). As a result, vicarious learning from direct rivals should have a positive impact on firm performance.
The second mechanism that explains firm heterogeneity from our perspective is competitive alignment. The concept of
“alignment”, rooted in population ecology and contingency theory (Hannan and Freeman,1977), has occupied a central role in
organization theory and strategic management (Venkatraman and Camillus,1984). The term “alignment” refers to “matching”
or “congruence”. It is commonly held that firms, in order to perform adequately, have to achieve alignment with both their
external and internal environments (Filatochev and Nakajima, 2010;Miller,1992; Siggelkow, 2001). Internal alignmentmeans
coherence among structure, strategy and processes, while external alignment refers to the match between the environment
and the organization (Siggelkow, 2001). Given that we analyze the consequences of strategic heterogeneity in the envi-
ronment, our focus is on external alignment.Please cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
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the firm. External alignment involves two kinds of adjustments. First, firms have to adapt to their general environment
(Bourgeois, 1980), which encompasses social, political and macroeconomic dimensions. Second, they have to achieve
congruence with their local environments, which includes factors such as the actions of their competitors, the preferences of
their customers and the available technology (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Siggelkow, 2001).
We focus on a particular type of external alignment, that which takes place with direct competitors (Zajac et al., 2000). We
refer to adjustment with direct rivals as competitive alignment. Firms that enjoy a high degree of competitive alignment are
more likely to survive the competitive actions of their rivals because they are capable of developing effective reactions. On the
contrary, in the absence of competitive alignment, the responses of firms are slower and less effective. As a consequence, the
lack of competitive alignment may have a negative effect on the performance of the firm. We consider that strategic het-
erogeneity in the set of rivals conditions the capacity of the firm to find a position that matches the positions of its com-
petitors. The higher the diversity in the group of rivals, the more heterogeneous the competitive actions that the firm will
have to confront and the more difficult it will be for the firm to develop effective responses that protect its market position.
Hypotheses
In this section, we take vicarious learning and competitive alignment into consideration to predict the relationship be-
tween strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals and focal firm performance. We suggest that this relationship adopts an
inverted U shape. After that, we argue that the effect of strategic heterogeneity changes as firms accumulate competitive
experience with the same rivals. Specifically, we propose that competitive experience reduces the impact of strategic het-
erogeneity in the set of rivals on firm performance. We explain this negative moderation by arguing that competitive
experience substitutes the observation of current rivals as a source of learning.
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals and focal firm performance
Vicarious learning and strategic heterogeneity
The amount of knowledge that can be acquired through vicarious learning depends on the variety of strategic orientations
developed by rivals. In heterogeneous contexts, the firm has a higher probability of observing novel strategic options and, in
turn, of learning suitable reactions to a greater number of contingencies. Firms that have a heterogeneous group of rivals
receive richer lessons about the competitive logic of their context (Barnett, 2008) and develop richer structures of knowledge
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Furthermore, given the wider set of strategic options considered, they have a lower
probability of systematically reproducing previous behaviors and of falling into competency traps (Levinthal and March,
1993).
The quality of acquired knowledge is also affected by the extent of strategic heterogeneity among rivals. Heterogeneity
helps to clarify latent causes and results in a deeper understanding of the problem at hand (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). If
every rival follows a similar strategy, the firm may accept the observed strategy as adequate, without further inquiry.
However, if many different strategies are implemented in the industry, the focal firm has to develop a more detailed
observation process to determine the best alternative. Consequently, strategic heterogeneity improves both the quantity and
the quality of the knowledge acquired through vicarious learning and, in turn, increases firm performance.
Nevertheless, the positive effect of vicarious learning is limited by the bounded rationality of managers (March and Simon,
1958; Reger and Huff, 1993; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996). Managers can process information only up to a certain level of
complexity. As a result, they tend to focus their attention on a limited set of issues and ignore others (Ocasio, 1997; Kabanoff
and Brown, 2008). Consequently, the amount of knowledge acquired by vicarious learning will not increase indefinitely with
the strategic heterogeneity of competitors. When heterogeneity is very high, not every strategic optionwill receive attention.
If the number of observed strategies is large, managers will be unable to assimilate and process every piece of information.
Thus, the marginal contribution of each new strategic combination is lower and the limits of the beneficial effect of strategic
heterogeneity are more visible.1
Competitive alignment and strategic heterogeneity
The difficulty of achieving an appropriate degree of alignment increases with the level of strategic heterogeneity among
rivals. There are two main reasons for this: 1) limited resources, and 2) incompatibility among strategic options. First, when
firms commit resources to different activities, the scarcity of resourcesmight imply trade-offs (Ghemawat,1991; Porter,1996).
This frequently means that firms have to choose among different actions when they decide their resource commitments. If
rivals develop heterogeneous strategies, firms will have to employ their resources in a wide range of activities to protect
themselves from a varied array of rivals' actions. A lack of resources prevents firms from developing strategic configurations1 As an anonymous reviewer suggests, the relationship between strategic heterogeneity and vicarious learning may be curvilinear. For example, it may be
possible that, above a certain level of strategic heterogeneity among competitors, firms are not only unable to continue learning vicariously, but are even
unable to make sense of what had already been learned (information overload could be a reason). Importantly, this does not affect Hypothesis 1, given that
it only requires that there is an upper limit on vicarious learning.
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which activities they will assign their resources. This increases the likelihood of them being insufficiently protected from the
actions that are not covered by the chosen configurations.
Second, even if resources were not scarce, achieving competitive alignment might also be complicated because of in-
compatibility among strategic activities. Adjusting to some rivals may require actions that are incompatible with the actions
necessary to adjust to others. In these circumstances, the firmwill be unable to protect itself against every single contingency,
even if it has sufficient resources. For instance, a retail bank with a set of rivals pursuing a proximity banking strategy may
adapt to them by introducing a high quality service or by increasing its branching network. However, these adaptations may
constrain the capability of the bank to adapt to a low-cost or low-service strategy pursued by a different set of rivals. In
situations of high heterogeneity, where the probability of incompatibility among strategic positions is greater, adjustment in
one direction will inhibit adaptation in others (Barnett, 2008; Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Levinthal and March, 1993).
Both in the case of limited resource availability and in that of incompatibility among strategic options, it is difficult for the
firm to achieve a reasonable degree of alignment against each rival, which has a negative effect on performance. Strategic
heterogeneity among competitors increases the likelihood of these two situations occurring. Consequently, from the
perspective of competitive alignment, strategic heterogeneity among competitors is inversely related to profitability.2
Strategic heterogeneity, vicarious learning and competitive alignment
Figure 2 depicts the predicted effect of strategic heterogeneity on firm performance that results from its partial effects on
vicarious learning and competitive alignment. On the one hand, strategic heterogeneity enhances vicarious learning and
increases the pool of organizational knowledge. The higher the quantity and quality of organizational knowledge, the more
effective the strategic decision-making process and the better the performance of the firmwill be. We predict that this effect
will have diminishing marginal returns due to the bounded rationality of managers, which restricts the learning capacity of
the firm. On the other hand, strategic heterogeneity reduces competitive alignment as a consequence of limited resources and
the incompatibility of strategic options. This has a negative effect on firm performance.
As the positive effect (enhanced knowledge) is limited, and the negative effect (reduced competitive alignment) grows
monotonically with strategic heterogeneity among competitors, we anticipate that the net effect will show an inverted U
shape. Firms operating in a context of very low or very high levels of strategic heterogeneity will perform worse than those








PlannHypothesis 1: Strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals has an inverted U-shaped effect on firm performance.ay also be that the costs associated with competitive alignment increase more than proportionally with strategic heterogeneity among competitors
stance, strategic complexity accumulates in a multiplicative way. In that case, hypothesis 1 would still hold, as it only requires the costs associated
mpetitive alignment to be monotonically increasing with strategic heterogeneity among competitors.
treat vicarious learning and competitive alignment as independent processes. However, there may be interdependences between the two con-
For instance, vicarious learning may reduce the costs associated with competitive alignment. Note that, for our hypothesis to hold, it suffices that, i)
efits of vicarious learning are bounded, and ii) the costs associated with competitive alignment are not. As long as any interaction effect does not
te the upper bound of vicarious learning or renders competitive alignment costs negligible, our reasoning applies.
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This research proposes that the influence of strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals depends on how long the focal firm
has been confronting the same rivals. In our setting, the competitive experience with the same rivals is considered as a source
of information and, therefore, only affects vicarious learning.4 This means that, when the firm has already confronted its
current rivals, it can learn different strategic options not only by directly observing them, but also by retrieving information
about past observations of them.We propose that, as a firm accumulates experience from competing with its direct rivals, the
need, utility and incentives to vicariously learn from their strategic heterogeneity decreases. As a consequence, the experience
accumulated against current rivals discourages the tendency of the firm to learn vicariously, reducing the impact of strategic
heterogeneity in the set of rivals on performance.
Organizational memory is a key element in our argument because it is a mechanism by which firms store and retrieve
information throughout their competitive history (Huber, 1991). Thanks to organizational memory, firms are able to accu-
mulate information about strategic alternatives in the form of procedures, norms and rules (Huber, 1991; Simon and
Lieberman, 2010). In our setting, competitive experience, by involving the observation of rivals over time, increases the
volume of information contained in organizational memory about strategic positions of current rivals. Once firms have stored
the strategies of their rivals in their memories, they may monitor and consider them less extensively as a source of infor-
mation. We base this assertion on the three mechanisms suggested by Schwab (2007), information preference, information
redundancy and information costs, to explain how, as competitive experience increases, firms tend to use information stored
in the organizational memory instead of gathering information through observation.
Information preference refers to the common tendency of firms to use internal rather than external information because
internal information is typically more detailed, salient and better understood than external information (Levinthal and
March, 1993). A long competitive history allows firms to refine their knowledge about the strategic options employed by
their rivals, which would imply that information about rivals stored in the organizational memory is more accurate than
information gathered simply through direct observation. So the information that comes from their organizational memory
will be reliable and reduce the incentives to learn by directly observing rivals.
Information redundancy takes place when firms obtain the same information from different sources. As we have
mentioned, organizational memory and the current observation of competitors can be considered as sources of information.
Firms may decide between elaborating knowledge from the information stored in their memories or through observing
others (Baum et al., 2000; Bruneel et al., 2010). The strategic options employed by rivals are stored in the organizational
memory as firms confront them over time. Therefore, a long competitive history confronting the same rivals results in a more
thorough knowledge of their market positions. In situations in which firms maintain stable competitive relationships, it is
more than likely that the information acquired through observation will already be known. In this sense, competitive
experience makes information that comes from vicarious learning redundant, which reduces the usefulness of observing
rivals.
Information costs are a consequence of information search and processing. Vicarious learning requires incurring infor-
mation costs when scanning the competitive environment, monitoring rivals and making inferences about the information
obtained through observation. As a result, vicarious learning involves a cost that stems from gathering and processing
external information. One way of reducing information costs is to use information that is already available (Lant and Baum,
1995; Ocasio, 1997). For example, by using information stored in the organizational memory, firms do not need to scan and
interpret the competitive environment. Thus, instead of learning vicariously, firms can utilize the knowledge stored in the
organizational memory. One way to accumulate information on in the organizational memory is through competitive
experience with the same rivals. Therefore, competitive experience replaces vicarious learning.
The three mechanisms proposed by Schwab (2007) provide us with arguments to explain how competitive experience
substitutes strategic heterogeneity as a source of learning. The propensity of firms to learn by observation decreases as they
acquire competitive experience with the same rivals. As explained above, when external and internal information is
redundantdwhich probably happenswhen firms have been confronting the same rivals for a long timed these firms rely on
information stored in their organizational memory, because it tends to be more reliable and less costly. Thus, competitive
experience reduces the tendency of firms to vicariously learn from rivals and favours the application of knowledge from the
organizational memory. In doing so, competitive experience reduces the importance of strategic heterogeneity in the set or






PlannHypothesis 2: The competitive experience accumulated by confronting the same rivals negatively moderates the effect of
strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals on performance.The proposed effect of our second hypothesis is graphically depicted in Figure 3.explain the moderating effect of competitive experience focusing exclusively on vicarious learning. While information gathered in the past is
lated in the organizational memory, making contemporaneous learning less necessary, the competitive alignment granted by a strategic position
the past cannot be transferred to a new competitive position. Consequently, experience affects vicarious learning, but not competitive alignment.
ent with this view, the literature on organizational learning has studied experience as a learning source but, as far as we know, the literature has not
d the consequences of experience on competitive alignment.
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Figure 3. The moderating effect of competitive experience
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Research context
Our research is carried out in the context of the Spanish retail banking sector between 1999 and 2009. This sector includes
three kinds of agents: savings banks, commercial banks and credit unions. We include banks whose activities are similar
enough to experience comparable environments, enjoy mutual learning opportunities and compete for the same potential
customers. The savings bank and commercial bank organizational forms were formally established in the first half of the
nineteenth century to cover different activities. Savings banks specialized in retail banking, while commercial banks, in their
origins, had a significant wholesale banking orientation. The third kind of agent, the credit union, was established in the early
twentieth century to propel financial inclusion and local development of rural areas.
From its inception, the sector was subject to a strict regulation that restricted the activities and geographical scope of
financial intermediaries, resulting in different rights and duties for the three types of agents. Geographical restrictions and
mandatory investment quotas generated the most important differences. Regarding geographical scope, each bank had its
activities restricted to a certain area within the country. At the same time, regulation required investment coefficients on
certain activities for each kind of bank. Regulation also prevented some types of agents from offering certain products, which
reinforced the differentiation of activities among them. However, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Spain modified
its banking regulatory framework to reduce formal restrictions, increasing the freedom for banking firms to organize their
activities. Among other measures, geographical restrictions, investment coefficients and product restrictions were repealed.
Each agent was allowed to carry out activities that were previously restricted for them and to expand their geographic scope
freely. As a result, the different types of banks became direct competitors in the retail banking sector (Coello, 1994).
During theperiodanalyzed therewasanoticeableexpansion in the activities of Spanishbankingfirms. Between1999and2009
thenumberof branchesoperatedbySpanishbanksgrewfrom less than39,000 toabout44,000. In termsof total assets, this growth
was evenmorepronounced. Total assetsmultipliedby3, from less than1,000billioneuros in 1999 tomore than3,000billion euros
in 2009. There was substantial variation in the scope and size of banks. For instance, in 2009, the two largest banks were Banco
Santander (2,945branches and416billion euros assets) andBancoBilbaoVizcayaArgentaria (3,070branches and391billion euros
assets). At the other extreme, therewere several dozen small banks that operated onlya fewbranches andmuch lower total assets.
Consequently, the Spanish retail banking sector is an interesting setting for our analysis for many reasons. First, as in other
contexts (see, for example, Hambrick et al., 2005), the elimination of the existing regulation has increased the number of
strategic combinations firms can develop and, more generally, the extent of intra-industry heterogeneity (Collis and Noda,
2001). Second, the fact that all the intermediaries are able to operate all over the country has produced a significant pro-
cess of entries into new markets (Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2001; Fuentelsaz et al., 2003), increasing the number and variety of
rivals that a firm has to confront. In sum, the industry seems an appropriate context inwhich to study firms' opportunities for
learning and their needs of achieving competitive alignment.
Sample and data sources
Our sample covers the period 1999e2009. The number of firms included in each year fluctuates between 163 and 124. This
fluctuation is explained by several mergers and acquisitions that take place over the period analyzed.Please cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
Planning (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2014.09.006
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instance, investment banks focus on high profile customers and do not offer conventional retail banking services. Also, there
are small rural banks that provide their services exclusively to a given community within a limited area. These banks do not
properly compete with other retail banks, and there is little or no potential for cross learning. Therefore, they are excluded
from the sample. We exclude banks that do not exceed four branches in any of the years because this is associated with
extreme geographical specialization and insignificant retail banking activities.5 The sample also excludes banks without
headquarters in the country because they do not publish detailed information on their activities in the Spanish subsidiary.6 In
spite of these exclusions, our sample is clearly representative of the Spanish banking sector. For instance, it includes 97.8
percent of the total assets in 2009.
The data used in this study have been collected from different sources. First, we take information on the address of every
branch located in Spain from Guia de la Banca, Cooperativas de Credito y Cajas de Ahorro, which is published yearly by
Editorial Maestre Ediban. We use this information to identify direct competitors as those firms that own branches in the same
locations. Second, we obtain information on financial statements from yearbooks published by the different trade associa-
tions in the sector.7 This is the source used to analyze the strategic configurations of banks. Finally, information on market
level factors and on other macroeconomic variables is obtained from the Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain and from the
National Institute of Statistics (INE).Variables
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is firm performance. Three different approaches are usually considered to measure firm
performance: price-cost margins, market-based measures (e.g., Tobin's q) and accounting-based measures (e.g., ROA)
(Scherer and Ross, 1990). Price cost margins are difficult to calculate because of the multiplicity and complexity of
products offered in the retail banking market and because banking firms are reluctant to disclose detailed information on
the costs and incomes associated with their products. Market-based measures require firms to be listed. In the Spanish
banking market, only a few commercial banks were listed during the period analyzed. Therefore, market-based perfor-
mance measures cannot be computed for the whole sample. Consequently, we use an accounting-based firm performance
measure as the dependent variable. We take financial performance, measured as return on assets (ROA), the ratio of
profits before taxes over total assets, as the dependent variable. ROA has frequently been used as a financial performance
measure when analyzing the banking sector (see, for instance, Barnett et al., 1994; Fuentelsaz et al., 2012; Roberts and
Amit, 2003). Each kind of bank was subject to the same accounting requirements, so their financial statements are
comparable.
Independent variables
The main independent variable is strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors. The first step for constructing this
variable is to identify the strategic configuration of each firm in the banking sector. The strategic position of a firm is depicted
as a function of its scope and its resource commitments (Cool and Schendel, 1987; Mehra, 1996; Ferguson et al., 2000).
Decisions about scope include the choice of market segment. Resource commitment involves the assignment of human,
capital and financial factors. In this research, the strategy of each firm is described through seven variables that depict both
these dimensions. All of them have been employed in previous research in the banking sector (Zú~niga-Vicente et al., 2004;
Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006; Prior and Surroca, 2006).
The strategic scope of a given firm is measured through the following five variables:
1. Commercial banking (Commercial loans/Financial investments): This ratio captures the banks' orientation towards
commercial banking. This strategic orientation is usually characterized by a high percentage of loans to domestic econ-
omies and small and medium-sized firms.
2. Investment banking (Portfolio of securities/Financial investments): This variable determines the extent to which a bank is
oriented towards active investments in stock markets.
3. Institutional banking (Transactions with other financial entities and the public sector/Financial investments): This ratio
indicates an institutional orientation. Firms that develop this kind of strategy tend to provide financial resources to other
financial entities and public institutions.
4. Net position in the financial system (Net position in the financial markets/Total liabilities): This ratio depicts the bank's
position in the interbank market. Specifically, it captures the extent to which a bank obtains funds in this market.5 Some of these organizations (e.g., investment banks) may still be of a substantial size in terms of total assets. However, as they offer their products
exclusively to selected customers, or they do not carry out retail banking activities, they are not included in the sample.
6 International banks that carry out retail banking activities have established headquarters in the country, but many of them do not have an important
presence. Therefore, most banks omitted because of insufficient data would also have been excluded because of their lack of retail banking activities (i.e.,
they do not control at least five branches in any period).
7 Some information is also offered about international banks without headquarters in Spain, but it is too aggregated to allow a proper analysis.
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traditional banking business, based on the accumulation of family savings. These firms get funds through classical financial
products.
Similarly, resource commitment is captured through two ratios:
6. Human capital (Personnel expenses/Operating income): This variable captures the importance of human capital.
7. Risk (Net insolvencies/Operating income): This measure tries to approximate the degree of risk that the firm is exposed to.
It reflects loans with a low probability of being recovered.
All of these dimensions depict strategic decisions (Zú~niga-Vicente et al., 2004). The commercial, investment and insti-
tutional banking variables classify Spanish banking entities according to their capacity to provide financial funds. Net position
in the financial system and traditional banking differentiate between two types of banking activities according to how the
financial resources are obtained. Finally, human capital shows the extent to which firms commit human resources and risk
shows the risk profile of the strategy followed. Each bank is assigned a position in the seven-dimensional strategic space
according to its values in the seven strategic variables.8 After that, calculating our main explanatory variable requires
identifying the relevant group of rivals.
Rivals are identified following a geographical criterion. Previous research has demonstrated that customers hold their
accounts and get retail banking services from branches that are located close to their home or their workplace (Radecki, 1998;
Simons and Stavins, 1998). This pattern has been found for a wide array of services including credit accounts, consumer
deposits, commercial loans, mortgages and small business loans (Cole and Wolken, 1995; Hannan, 1991; Kwast et al., 1997;
Sharpe, 1997; Rhoades, 1992). Consequently, there is little (or zero) cross-elasticity of demand among different geographical
markets. That is, only firms within the same geographical market are considered as alternatives from the perspective of the
customers and are, therefore, direct competitors. Moreover, geographical proximity permits more frequent contacts between
rivals, which enhances organizational learning (Hendry and Brown, 2006). Therefore, a geographical definition of markets is
also consistent with our theoretical model.
The definition of the market should consider the area within which a customer would look for branches to get retail
banking services (de Juan, 2003).We define geographical markets at the ZIP code level. A ZIP codemay include several villages
in a small areawhereas large townsmay have several ZIP codes. ZIP codes were initially established to arrange postal services.
Therefore, the ZIP code identifies areas that are functionally proximate. Accordingly, the set of rivals is composed of firms that
operate at least in one of the ZIP codes in which the focal firm also does. Firms are considered to operate in every market in
which they have located any of their branches. It should be noted that our conception of the set of rivals assumes that the
group of competitors is specific to each firm in the industry, that is, we consider that every firm in the industry confronts a
particular set of rivals.
To measure the level of strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals of a focal firm, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we










where j refers to the n rivals with which the focal firm competes, and k refers to the 7 strategic variables defined above. Let Xk
be the mean value of a strategic variable k for all of the n competitors of the focal firm. Correspondingly, the vector (X1…X7)
identifies the centroid of the strategic space occupied by these rivals. As each firm participates in different geographical
markets (defined at the zip code level), each firm also has a different set of rivals with its own strategic centroid.
In the second step, we calculate the mean strategic distance of these competitors.





where the subscript i refers to the focal firm and the other subscripts have been defined above. A low value of strategic
heterogeneity in the set of competitors should be interpreted as indicative that, on average, the rivals of a focal firm occupy
similar strategic positions whether or not their positions are similar to the strategic position of the focal firm. High values, on
the other hand, imply that the rivals are strategically heterogeneous. According to Hypothesis 1, both situations should be8 The seven strategic variables are standardized before this calculation.
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variable is used to test Hypothesis 1.9
Our second theoretical variable is competitive experience. This variable reflects the number of years inwhich the focal firm
has been confronting the same rivals. For each of its current competitors, it is calculated as the number of years out of the last
seven inwhich both firms have competed in at least one zip code. Then, it is averaged among all of its current competitors.We
limit this variable to seven years because, after a certain time, the competitive experience effect may disappear (e.g., Barnett
and Hansen, 1996). In addition, empirical studies have shown that firms not only learn, but also forget the acquired
knowledge (Argote et al., 1990; Darr et al., 1995). In our framework, this means that firms are not always able to recover past
information, especially when it was obtained a long time ago.
High values of competitive experience mean that firms have competed for long periods with their current set of com-
petitors. In contrast, low values of competitive experience may result fromyoung firms or from changes in the composition of
the set of direct rivals. The variable competitive experience is introduced both as a direct term and as an interaction termwith
the variable strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors to explore the moderating effect advanced in Hypothesis 2.
Control variables
We include three controls at the market level: unemployment, number of rivals and dynamism of the set of rivals. Unem-
ployment describes the unemployment rate in the provinces inwhich the bank operates. We expect a negative influence of this
variable on firm performance. Number captures the number of rivals with which the firm competes. This variable is meant to
control for competitive intensity. It is expected that the larger the number of rivals, the more intense the rivalry between them.
Finally, dynamism of the set of rivals depicts the change in the market positions of direct competitors. Learning and achieving
competitive alignment are easier when rivals maintain their positions over time. In these situations, firms can observe the long-
term consequences of the strategies used by their competitors. At the same time, the continuous effort of achieving competitive
alignment is reduced due to the stability in the behaviors of rivals. To calculate this variable, we need to determine the strategic









where Xjkt is the value of firm j in strategic variable k in period t, and Xjkt1 is the value of the same variable in the previous
year. The variable dynamism of the set of competitors is calculated as the average strategy variation among the n competitors
of the focal firm:





We also include several firm-level controls. Inefficiency, measured as the ratio of operating costs over ordinarymargin, and
risk, measured as the ratio of total credits over total assets (Carbo et al., 2003). We also control for firm size, log (total assets),
and for the strategic distance of the firm from competitors to take into account the traditional effect of strategic similarity on
profitability, calculated as the Euclidean distance between the strategic position of the focal firm and the centroid of the
strategic distribution of its set of competitors.
Finally, we must include the direct effect of competitive experience to adequately interpret the moderating effect of the
experience that firms accumulate by competing with the same rivals on the link between strategic heterogeneity and per-
formance. By including this variable, we control for the direct influence that a long competitive history confronting the same
rivals produces on learning and alignment.
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are shown in Table 1.
Model estimation
Wecarried out several specification tests to choose the appropriatemodel. The Breusch-Pagan LagrangeMultiplier test rejects
the null hypothesis that the variance of firm-level effects is zero (X2¼ 438.17; p-value¼ 0.000), which is interpreted as evidence
of individual effects. The Hausman test indicates the presence of fixed effects (X2 ¼ 85.01; p-value ¼ 0.00). Consequently, we
estimate afixed effectsmodel. Furthermore, to control for contemporary shocks common to all thefirms in the sector, such as the
economic cycle or regulatory decisions, the model includes annual fixed effects. Consequently, we estimate a two-way fixed
effects model. Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and residuals are clustered by firm.9 As illustration, the largest firms in the Spanish retail-banking sector, Banco Santander and Banco Bilbao Bizcaya Argentaria, face medium levels of
strategic heterogeneity (1.69 in both cases). The lowest and the highest levels of heterogeneity in the group of rivals are found for Caja de Credito de Petrel (1.
24) and Caja Campo (2.12), both included in the group of credit unions.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean 0.92 11.50 66.58 0.56 0.68 0.68 14.13 2.30 5.91 1.96
S.D. 2.48 4.67 36.74 0.31 0.63 0.18 1.80 1.38 0.83 0.28
Minimum 25.21 0.00 4.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 9.73 0.38 1.00 1.24
Maximum 59.00 30.20 162 1.52 12.63 0.99 19.30 13.67 7.00 2.75
1. ROA 1.00
2. Unemployment 0.05 1.00
3. Number of rivals 0.06 0.01 1.00
4. Dynamism of the set of rivals 0.02 0.05 0.06 1.00
5. Inefficiency 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00
6. Risk 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.16 1.00
7. Log (assets) 0.10 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.17 0.06 1.00
8. Strategic distance of the firm from competitors 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.31 1.00
9. Competitive experience 0.14 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.28 0.10 1.00
10. Strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors 0.03 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.08 1.00
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Table 2 shows our estimations. Column 1 shows the baseline model, which includes the control variables. The baseline
model is globally significant, confirming the importance of the controls introduced. Column 2 adds the direct effect of strategic
heterogeneity in the set of competitors. This variable is not statistically significant. Column 3 includes the squared effect of
strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors (Hypothesis 1). In this estimation, the direct and squared effects of our main
theoretical variable are statistically significant. In addition, the introduction of the squared effect improves the fit of themodel,
as theWald test indicates (bottom of the table). Column 4 shows the fully specified model inwhich strategic heterogeneity in
the set of competitors interactswith competitive experience (Hypothesis 2). This newestimation shows significant parameters
for all the theoretical variables and the fit of the model improves (see Wald test at the bottom of the table).Table 2
Estimations of the profitability model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 0.0180** 0.0180** 0.0161** 0.0132
(2.20) (2.23) (1.99) (1.64)
Number 0.00312 0.00308 0.00437 0.0101***
(0.90) (0.86) (1.22) (2.76)
Dynamism of the set of rivals 0.0374 0.0365 0.0912 0.0862
(0.15) (0.14) (0.35) (0.35)
Inefficiency 0.129 0.129 0.132 0.0915
(1.29) (1.28) (1.31) (0.92)
Risk 0.199 0.199 0.225 0.194
(0.55) (0.55) (0.63) (0.58)
Log (assets) 0.0627 0.0618 0.0466 0.0116
(0.27) (0.26) (0.20) (0.05)
Strategic distance from competitors 0.187** 0.187* 0.185* -0.196**
(1.96) (1.96) (1.95) (2.07)
Year effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Competitive experience 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.228*** 4.272*
(3.35) (3.35) (3.22) (1.90)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors 0.00865 3.276** 29.96**
(0.05) (2.37) (2.16)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors2 0.794** 8.396**
(2.29) (2.42)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors X Competitive experience
4.834**
(2.10)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors2 X Competitive experience
1.367**
(2.37)
N 1373 1373 1373 1373
Adj. R2 0.164 0.164 0.170 0.221
Wald test vs 1 0.00 5.87** 15.06***
Wald test vs 2 5.25*** 14.66***
Wald test vs 3 11.75***
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Residuals are clustered by firm.
The models of Table 2 are estimated by a two-way fixed effects model.
Please cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
Planning (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2014.09.006
Figure 4. Effect of strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals for different levels of competitive experience
J. Gomez et al. / Long Range Planning xxx (2014) 1e19 13Hypothesis 1 states that strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors has an inverted U-shaped effect on firm per-
formance. The parameter of the direct effect in column 3 is positive (b ¼ 3.276; p < 0.05) and the parameter of the squared
effect is negative (b¼0.794; p < 0.05). These parameters suggest an inverted U-shaped effect. Nevertheless, for this inverted
U shape to be meaningful in our estimations, the inflection point must belong to the range of values of the variable strategic
heterogeneity in the set of competitors observed in the sample. The inflection point is 2.06, which falls within the range of our
sample. Therefore, our estimations support hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 states that competitive experience negatively moderates the effect of strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors on performance. The parameter of the interaction term between competitive experience and the direct effect of
heterogeneity is negative (b ¼ 4.834; p < 0.05), while the parameter of the interaction term between competitive expe-
rience and the squared effect of heterogeneity is positive (b¼ 1.367; p < 0.05). The combination of these two results generates
an effect with an ambiguous interpretation. To understand it, Figure 4 depicts the effect of heterogeneity on performance for
representative values of the moderating variable.
The different lines show the effect of strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors for 1, 3, 5 and 7 years of competitive
experience. As the graph shows, the inverted U moves down as competitive experience increases. This confirms that the
experience that firms accumulate by competing with the same rivals reduces the effect of the strategic heterogeneity in the
set of competitors on performance.Robustness checks and further analyses
Table 3 shows the results of several robustness checks and some additional analyses that were performed in order to
explore some alternative explanations to our results.10 Column 1 analyzes the impact of the financial crisis on our results. In
2008, an international financial crisis broke out, affecting banking sectors all over the world.11 The change in external con-
ditions after the financial crisis modified banking activities as firms adapted to the new situation. Therefore, a position in the
strategic spacemay experience noticeable changes after the crisis. Column 1 shows the estimation of the fully specifiedmodel
of Table 2 restricted to the period (1999e2007), that is, excluding the years of the crisis. The parameter of the direct term
associated with strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors is positive and significant (b ¼ 43.23; p < 0.05) and the
parameter of the squared term is negative and significant (b¼11.20; p < 0.05). The parameters of the interaction termswith
competitive experience are also consistent with the main estimations (b ¼ 6.457; p < 0.05 and b ¼ 1.696; p < 0.05,
respectively). Consequently, our results seem robust to any potential distortions generated by the financial crisis.
Column 2 estimates the full model, but we identify direct rivals defining markets at the provincial level. Therefore, in this
analysis, firms that operate in, at least, one of the provinces in which the focal firm develops its activities compose the set of
rivals. Note that whereas, in 2009, the last year of our observationwindow, banks operated in 5,913 different ZIP codes, Spain
has only 50 provinces. A province includes several municipalities. As a consequence, identifying rivals at the province level
means that a particular firm could be considered as a rival without operating in the same municipality. This new criterion
involves an increase in the number of firms that are considered as rivals.
The parameter of the direct term of strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors is positive and significant (b ¼ 1.334;
p < 0.01) and the parameter of the squared term is negative and significant (b ¼ 0.432; p < 0.01). The parameters of the
interaction with competitive experience are b ¼ 0.124 (n.s) and b ¼ 0.064 (p < 0.05) respectively. These results confirm our
first hypothesis about the effect of strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors. However, the moderating influence of
competitive experience is not statistically significant when rivals are identified at the provincial level. This differencemay be a10 Several appreciations of the reviewers showed the necessity of developing these analyses. We are grateful to the reviewers for their helpful comments.
11 Although it is difficult to establish the beginning of the financial crisis, the Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (September the 14th of 2008) is usually
considered as the starting point in economic media.
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Table 3
Robustness checks and further analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment 0.00930 0.0270*** 0.00121 0.00118 0.000678 0.000341 0.000591
(0.72) (3.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
Number 0.0140*** 0.00474** 0.00780*** 0.00778*** 0.00841*** 0.00853*** 0.00836***
(3.17) (2.30) (4.16) (4.16) (4.07) (4.16) (4.02)
Dynamism of the set of rivals 0.0478 0.911** 0.0758 0.0751 0.0434 0.116 0.112
(0.16) (2.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.17) (0.47) (0.46)
Inefficiency 0.116 0.132 0.158* 0.159*
(0.81) (1.26) (1.66) (1.66)
Risk 0.190 0.154 0.305 0.305 0.304 0.294 0.278
(0.51) (0.43) (0.87) (0.87) (0.88) (0.86) (0.82)
Log (assets) 0.0783 0.157 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.170***
(0.32) (0.61) (3.79) (3.79) (3.84) (3.88) (3.67)
Strategic distance from competitors 0.221** 0.205** 0.0924 0.0924 0.106* 0.101* 0.969
(2.07) (2.39) (1.49) (1.49) (1.70) (1.65) (0.64)
Year effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Competitive experience 6.236* 0.000721 4.120*** 4.125*** 4.445*** 4.115*** 3.654***
(1.92) (0.01) (2.91) (2.91) (3.23) (3.19) (2.61)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors 43.23** 1.334*** 26.66*** 26.67*** 28.45*** 25.72*** 20.32*
(2.21) (3.20) (3.00) (3.00) (3.29) (3.19) (1.89)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors2 11.20** 0.432*** 7.282*** 7.284*** 7.790*** 7.075*** 5.599**
(2.38) (2.89) (3.14) (3.14) (3.45) (3.35) (2.01)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors X Competitive experience
6.457** 0.124 4.569*** 4.574*** 4.938*** 4.623*** 4.117***
(2.02) (1.34) (3.08) (3.08) (3.42) (3.41) (2.81)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of
competitors2 X Competitive experience
1.696** 0.0641** 1.248*** 1.249*** 1.350*** 1.277*** 1.141***
(2.21) (2.15) (3.20) (3.21) (3.56) (3.57) (3.00)
Profitabilityt1 0.146* 0.146* 0.144* 0.144* 0.143**
(1.83) (1.83) (1.87) (1.92) (1.96)
M&A 0.0440 0.0268 0.0395 0.0541
(0.75) (0.44) (0.62) (0.89)
Average profitability of rivals 0.667*** 0.619**
(2.59) (2.30)
Strategic heterogeneity in the set of




Strategic heterogeneity in the set




Constant 25.55*** 25.58*** 27.34*** 24.94*** 20.01*
(2.98) (2.98) (3.28) (3.20) (1.87)
N 1121 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373
Adj. R2 0.228 0.170
Wald Chi2 279.86*** 280.46*** 282.35*** 275.69*** 308.57***
AR(1) 2.70*** 2.69*** 2.89*** 2.97*** 2.98***
AR(2) 1.45 1.45 1.57 1.54 1.39
Hansen 0.875 0.877 0.835 0.818 0.775
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Residuals are clustered by firm.
Columns 1 and 2 are estimated by a two-way fixed effects model. Columns 3e7 are estimated by System GMM.
J. Gomez et al. / Long Range Planning xxx (2014) 1e1914result of a misspecification of the market. Customers in the retail banking sector tend to get retail banking services from
offices located close to their living area or their job. This tendency makes it unlikely that a potential customer will consider all
the branches in the province as retail banking providers. Consequently, in the Spanish retail banking sector, the provincial
level of analysis may be too broad to identify competitors (de Juan, 2003). In other words, identifying rivals at the provincial
level may introduce noise into the measure, reducing the efficiency of the estimation and, in turn, the capability of the model
to identify the predicted effects.
Column 3 introduces previous performance as a control. Best performers may have access to superior resources and, as a
consequence, be able to develop more effective strategies. This fact increases the incentives of firms to achieve competitive
alignment with the best performers, given that the lack of alignment with them could be especially harmful. Aligning to the
best performers means a higher capacity to respond to any of their moves and, therefore, reduces the probability and severity
of their actions (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). The tendency of firms to prioritize adjustment to the best performers could
reduce the complexity of achieving competitive alignment for these firms. Column 3 introduces previous performance to
control for this potential bias.
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable makes our model a dynamic panel data model. Considering fixed effects in a
dynamic model can cause problems. Firm-level effects generate correlation between the lagged dependent variable and thePlease cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
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System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In this method, fixed effects are removed by first differencing all the variables. Then,
the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable is corrected by instrumenting it with a number of its past observations,
both in levels and in differences. For the model to be appropriate, two conditions must hold. First, there must be no second
order serial correlation d negative first order serial correlation is provoked by the differentiation of variables, but it is not
harmful (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, the instruments have to be exogenous (or at least predetermined). These con-
ditions are tested at the bottom of Table 3 with the AR(2) and Hansen tests, respectively (note that subsequent estimations
including the lagged dependent variable as a control are also estimated by System GMM). The parameter of the variable
profitabilityt1 is positive and significant (b ¼ 0.146; p < 0.1), indicating some persistence of performance. The results of our
main theoretical variables remain qualitatively unchanged.
Column 4 considers the influence of mergers and acquisitions on our results. During the period analyzed, there were
several mergers and acquisitions in the Spanish retail banking sector that altered the set of rivals faced by each firm and,
therefore, modified the level of heterogeneity in the nearest competitive context. To control for the possible consequences of
mergers of acquisitions on vicarious learning and competitive alignment, we introduce the variable M&A into our analysis.
This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firm-year observations involved in amerger or acquisition and 0 otherwise.
We expect firms to obtain a temporary negative shock on their profitability in the year in which the merger or acquisition
takes place as a result of the assimilation efforts and the distortion on their operations. As Table 3 shows, the parameter of
M&A is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the addition of this variable does not alter our findings.
Column 5 drops the variable inefficiency in order to check the robustness of our results. The variable inefficiency may well
be considered as another outcome of the activities of the firm, rather than as a control variable. The elimination of this
variable does not alter our results significantly.
Column 6 includes the average profitability of direct rivals as a control. Firms facing high performers may learn more
efficient strategic options than firms facing low performers. We control for the average profitability of rivals to consider the
potential effects that the success of observed rivals may have on the vicarious learning process. The parameter of the term
associated with average profitability of rivals is positive and significant (b ¼ 0.667; p < 0.01), which is consistent with this
observation. The inclusion of this control variable maintains the effect of our main theoretical variables qualitatively
unchanged.12
Finally, column 7 analyzes the potential interactive nature between the traditional perspective to examine heterogeneity
and the approach that is proposed in this research. In other words, it explores whether the effect of strategic heterogeneity in
the set of competitors varies according to the strategic position of the focal firm in relation to its rivals (strategic distance from
competitors). Our contention is that firms that occupy similar positions to their rivals benefit more from strategic hetero-
geneity among them. First, the observation of similar rivals offers information about suitable reactions to opportunities and
threats that directly concern the focal firm (Baum et al., 2000; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Second, a particular attacker may
be hesitant to target a similar rival because it has the necessary capability to effectively retaliate (Chen, 1996; Chen et al.,
2007). This means that strategic similarity involves a certain degree of competitive alignment. As a consequence, when
firms try to align with the strategic position of similar rivals, they need to carry out fewer internal changes. This fact reduces
the resources and efforts employed to achieve competitive alignment, as well as the complexity that stems from adaptation to
the set of rivals. Therefore, strategic proximity should improve the capacity of firms to learn from and align with a hetero-
geneous group of rivals, that is, it should positively moderate the effect that comes from strategic heterogeneity among
competitors.13
The parameter of the interaction term associated with strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors and strategic dis-
tance from competitors is positive and non-significant (b ¼ 1.005; n.s) and the parameter of the interaction term of strategic
heterogeneity in the set of competitors2 and strategic distance from competitors is negative and non-significant (b¼0.280;
n.s). Therefore, we do not find empirical evidence of interactive effects between the traditional perspective to analyze het-
erogeneity and the strategic heterogeneity in the set of rivals. However, it is noteworthy that the lack of statistical evidence
might be the result of the complexity of ourmodel (Aiken andWest,1991).We elaborate on this point in the following section.Discussion
In this paper, we analyze the effect of strategic heterogeneity on firm performance by taking a new perspective. We study
the consequences of varying levels of heterogeneity in the set of competitors, instead of examining strategic similarity (or12 As an additional analysis, we replicated our estimations considering the strategic heterogeneity of only the rivals whose profitability is above the annual
average of the sector. In these results, we find support for the curvilinear effect of strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors, but we cannot confirm the
moderating effect of competitive experience. This change may result from a misspecification of learning opportunities. Firms learn not only from success,
but also from the failures (or near failures) of other firms (Ingram and Baum, 1997; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Kim and Miner, 2007). Consequently, the
exclusion of low performers may result in less efficient estimations and lower statistical significance.
13 To explore the complementary effect of the two perspectives to heterogeneity, we focus on analyzing how strategic distance moderates the effect of
strategic heterogeneity among rivals. We consider that this theoretical approach has a more natural fit for the objective of our research, which is to extend
the knowledge about the heterogeneity in the set of rivals. Given that vicarious learning and competitive alignment are the mechanisms that help to
explain the consequences of heterogeneity among competitors, we explain the moderating influence of strategic distance through these mechanisms.
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analyze how strategic heterogeneity among competitors affects firm performance through two mechanisms: vicarious
learning and competitive alignment. Both mechanisms are directly related to our conception of heterogeneity, given that
strategic diversity in the set of competitors influences the strategic options from which the firm can learn and the strategic
options towhich it has to adapt to compete. In addition, we argue that, as firms accumulate experience by competing with the
same rivals, the impact of strategic heterogeneity among competitors on performance changes. We explain the moderating
influence of competitive experience through information preference, information redundancy and information costs
(Schwab, 2007). These mechanisms suggest that experience with the same rivals is a substitute for observation as a source of
learning.
The theoretical model receives empirical support. In the case of strategic heterogeneity in the set of competitors, we
confirm the predicted inverted U-shaped effect on firm performance. This means that firms that operate in a context with low
or high levels of strategic heterogeneity will perform worse than firms that operate in a context with a moderate level of
heterogeneity. This pattern is consistent with the two main mechanisms of our theoretical model. First, heterogeneity in the
set of competitors enhances organizational learning, but only within the limits imposed by the bounded rationality of
managers. Second, heterogeneity among competitors reduces competitive alignment as a consequence of limited resources
and of the incompatibility of strategic options.
These results resemble the empirical evidence that employs the traditional approach to examine heterogeneity, at least to
a certain extent. Some papers in this literature conclude that the optimum market positions of firms are those that find a
balance between similarity and divergence in relation to rivals (Deephouse, 1999; McNamara et al., 2003; Phillips and
Zuckerman, 2001; Porac et al., 1989). In the same line, we find that the ideal competitive setting is one in which firms
confront a moderately heterogeneous set of competitors. This suggests that a medium level of heterogeneity could provide
the best results not only when heterogeneity is simultaneously analyzed in terms of competition and legitimation
(Deephouse,1999), but also when vicarious learning and competitive alignment are the mechanisms employed to explain the
consequences of firm heterogeneity. Consequently, it seems that our approach to studying strategic heterogeneity provides
additional empirical evidence about the advantages of a moderate level of strategic diversity.
In the case of competitive experience, our findings suggest a complex moderating relationship. However, for the range of
values observed in our sample, we confirm that competitive experience negatively moderates the impact of heterogeneity in
the set of rivals on firm performance. This means that the effect of heterogeneity dissipates as firms accumulate experience
confronting the same rivals. The dilution of the influence of heterogeneity appears to be due to a substitution effect between
organizational memory and observation which, as our results suggest, act as alternative sources of learning.
As repeated competitive interactions allow firms to accumulate enough information about rivals, information preference,
information redundancy and information costs provide incentives to use the knowledge in the organizational memory, rather
than relying on observation. This finding may have important implications for the organizational learning literature that
focuses on determining the tendency of firms to learn from internal or external sources of information (Bresman, 2010; Haas
and Hansen, 2005; Schwab, 2007; He andWong, 2004). The fact that competitive experience replaces heterogeneity in the set
of rivals as a source of learning shows the preference of the firm for using internal information. Once competitive experience
provides the required information about the market positions of rivals, firms rely on it instead of collecting new information
from the environment.
Overall, our findings deepen our understanding of intra-industry heterogeneity, which is an important topic in the
strategic management field (Barney, 1991; Hatten and Schendel 1977; Rumelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). The classical approach to
the concept focuses on heterogeneity between the focal firm and its rivals. However, to our knowledge, there are no papers
analyzing the implications of heterogeneity among competitors. From this perspective, we can introduce newmechanisms to
explore the influence of intra-industry heterogeneity on the performance of industry participants. Instead of using arguments
based on competition, legitimacy and collusion, we focus on vicarious learning and competitive alignment. We hope that this
new perspective of analysis and the use of newmechanisms to explain the consequences of intra-industry heterogeneity will
help to improve our understanding of firm performance.
Finally, it is important to stress that despite the plausibility of an interaction between the traditional approach and the new
perspective our analyses do not detect any complementarity between the two perspectives. Therefore, the two perspectives
seem to be independent. But, even if this were the case, ourmain results reveal that the addition of the variables capturing the
new perspective are relevant and do not affect the significance of the traditional approach.
Managerial implications
Our findings have important implications for managers. First, our research shows a new factor that managers should take
into account when they analyze their set of rivals: the strategic differences among them. Our results imply that managers
should not only pay attention to their strategic positioning in relation to their competitors; they should also consider the
degree of heterogeneity in the set of rivals, given that it conditions vicarious learning and competitive alignment. Therefore,
we recommend managers to take both perspectives into consideration when formulating their competitive strategy.
Second, our research shows that the attractiveness of a given competitive context depends both on the degree of strategic
heterogeneity among competitors and the experience accumulated against them. From the perspective of strategic hetero-
geneity competitive environments characterized by moderate levels of strategic heterogeneity among competitors providePlease cite this article in press as: Gomez, J., et al., Competitors' Strategic Heterogeneity and Firm Performance, Long Range
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managers will easily achieve competitive alignment, but they will miss the opportunity to learn different strategies,
increasing the risk of myopic learning processes and competence traps (Levinthal and March, 1993). If, on the contrary,
strategic heterogeneity is too high managers will experience difficulties both to correctly align against rivals and to interpret
external information. Consequently, this seems to be the worst scenario. Importantly, these scenarios are heavily influenced
by competitive experience. It is important to note that, as firms accumulate experience against their direct competitors, this
relationship almost disappears, reducing the importance of the strategic heterogeneity among them. Consequently, when a
firm faces rivals with which it shares a long competitive history, their strategic heterogeneity should not be a prime concern.
Third, our findings are informative for entry strategies. As our results show, the effect of strategic heterogeneity among
competitors is higher when firms have low, or no, competitive experience with rivals. Consequently, a new firm, or an
established firm initiating activities in a new industry, is especially sensitive to the mechanisms described in our model. That
is, in addition to paying attention to its strategic distance from its new competitors (Caves and Porter,1977; Deephouse,1999),
this firm should also be especially attentive to the strategic heterogeneity among rivals, because its lack of competitive
experience maximizes the impact of this dimension of strategic heterogeneity. Importantly, this influence is relevant only for
inexperienced firms. Our results suggest that, after the firm accumulates competitive experience, this dimension of strategic
heterogeneity becomes much less important and the firm should mainly focus on its strategic positioning in relation to these
rivals.
Limitations and future research
It is worth noting some limitations of this research. First, although we theorize in terms of vicarious learning and
competitive alignment, we do not measure them. Instead, we take an indirect approach, inferring their influence through
their final effect on firm performance. This is a usual procedure when a theoretical relationship is first identified. However, to
consolidate the model presented in this article, direct tests of these mechanisms would be necessary. As it is difficult to
objectively measure these mechanisms, a suitable approach would be the use of questionnaires. Top managers, as well as
middle managers, could be questioned about their perceptions on the ease with which they obtain useful information from
their rivals, as well as the extent to which they feel protected against attacks from their competitors. Comparing these
perceptions across different levels of strategic heterogeneity may clarify the relationship between strategic heterogeneity
among competitors and these constructs, and corroborate the assumptions of this model.
Second, our analysis of the potential complementarity between the strategic distance from competitors and the strategic
heterogeneity among these competitors did not detect statistically significant effects, though the theoretical mechanisms at
play were sound. This result has to be interpreted with some caution. Aiken and West (1991, 93) highlight that even for
moderate correlation levels among variables their interaction terms may be highly instable. Furthermore, they point out that
a “central issue in testing complex regression equations is that the lower order effects and the interactions are not typically
independent” and “…the variance that is shared by terms in the equation could potentially be apportioned to the higher and
lower order effects in several different ways” (Aiken and West, 1991, 101e102). That is, the lack of statistical evidence in our
analyses may well be the result of the statistical complexities of testing interactions in such a context. Therefore, future
research should replicate this analysis in different sectors to further study the complementary nature of the two perspectives.
If therewere some form of complementarity between the two constructs, its identificationmay further clarify the influence of
strategic heterogeneity on firm performance.
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